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Iconic Properties are Lost when Translating Visual Graphics to Text for Accessibility 
Peter Coppin, Ambrose Li, and Michael Carnevale 
For many blind and low-vision individuals, accessing charts and graphs often means 
accessing a text description of the graphics, usually aurally. However, in doing so, parts 
of the charts that are not originally conveyed textually are lost in the translation into text. 
By synthesizing ideas from the science and philosophy of perception and cognition, 
diagrammatic reasoning, and semiotics, this essay makes the case that translating charts 
into text descriptions results in the loss of iconic properties of the graphics, and proposes 
that non-linguistic sonification can be recruited to preserve such properties. The essay 
concludes by proposing how predictions based on this synthesis can inform design.  
Keywords: Graphic representation, diagrammatic representation, sentential 
representation, pictorial representation, symbolic representation, iconic representation, 
graphic-linguistic distinction, iconic-symbolic distinction, semiotics, cognitive semiotics, 
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1. Introduction
Imagine a blind or low-vision individual who needs to access a graphic, for example a financial 
chart (Figure 1a). Unlike a sighted individual, who can see the actual chart, what the blind or 
low-vision individual accesses, usually aurally, is often its text description. Both individuals are 
accessing a depiction of rising and falling stock prices over time. However, whereas the sighted 
individual sees words and undulating shapes, all the screen reader user hears are words 
(Figure 1d). 
Such is the state of the art in accessible graphics: Many blind and low-vision individuals 
depend on approaches like the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) to provide them 
with text descriptions – translations of the graphics into text which these individuals can then 
access via a screen reader, usually aurally via text-to-speech. Text descriptions are essentially 
interpretations meant to convey the meaning intended by the author of the graphic. However, if a 
text description can fully convey the meaning of the graphic, then why did the author create the 
graphic in the first place? 
 
 
Figure 1. Deconstruction of a financial chart. The original chart (a) comprises parts conveyed via 
shapes (b) and parts conveyed via text (c), but in a text description (d) parts originally conveyed 
via shapes are also conveyed via text (e). Adapted from “Web Accessibility Best Practices: 
Graphs” by Campus Information Technologies and Educational Services (CITES) and Disability 
Resources and Educational Services (DRES), University of Illinois at Urbana/Champaign. 
Copyright 2005 by University of Illinois at Urbana/Champaign. 
 
1.1. Formulating a Design Problem From the Scenario 
In the foregoing scenario, parts of the chart, predominantly numerical values and labels 
(Figure 1c), are already text and will naturally carry over to the text description. However, I claim 
that the rest of the chart (Figure 1b) is not and cannot be adequately
1
 translated into text because 
these parts that are originally conveyed via shapes are fundamentally different from the parts 
originally conveyed via text. Shimojima (1999) calls this fundamental difference the “graphic-
linguistic distinction,” while a semiotician might see this as Lessing’s dichotomy of “pictures” 
versus “literature” (cf. Wellbery’s understanding of Lessing, as elucidated by Sonesson, 1988); in 
either case, one might predict the parts originally conveyed via shapes to be “lost in translation.” 
Suppose a designer wants to improve the state of the art and design a system of accessible 
graphics that minimizes what is “lost in translation.” Let us call this our target design problem. 
Because the state of the art is often aural, we claim that a sound-based solution is appropriate 
given our target design problem. 
Although touch (cf. Kennedy, 1993) might be a more natural fit than sound, if the state of 
the art is primarily aural, a sound-based solution is probably more immediately applicable and 
probably aligns better with our target design problem. Also, although screen readers can deliver 
text descriptions tactilely as braille, refreshable braille displays are expensive relative to audio 
hardware. As well, although touch screens might be tactile, Klatsky, Giudice, Benntt, and Loomis 
(2014) have shown that conveying information tactilely via touch screens suffers from challenges 
related to haptic perception. Touch screens are also not as ubiquitous and inexpensive as audio 
hardware. 
1.2. Recasting the Design Problem as a Theoretical Question 
Now, to solve our target design problem we will first need to conceptualize what is actually lost, 
but identifying what is lost will identify distinct and common properties of graphics relative to 
text. Theoretically, then, our true goal is not our target design problem, but the conceptualization 
of what is lost during the translation from visual graphics to text descriptions –  in other words, a 
theoretical model. Practically, however, this model can then inform the design of new approaches 
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 We are adapting Toury’s (as cited in Palumbo, 2009, p. 8) definition of adequacy here, so by adequately we mean being able to 
subscribe to the norms of the source culture (of visual graphics) and to express the relations expressed in the source culture. 
This definition is consistent with the understanding that text descriptions should convey the author’s intent. 
for conveying properties of graphically represented shapes in non-visual perception modes, 
which in our target design problem would be sound. 
1.3. How Such a Theoretical Model Could be Tested 
While we will not discuss specific plans to test the model, since the translation of graphics to text 
is a translation process, the concept of “back-translation” (cf. Palumbo, 2009, p. 14) can be 
adapted to serve as the basis of experiments to test and challenge the model itself.  
1.4. How This Essay is Organized 
Our conceptualization of what is lost will be based on the science of perception and cognition, 
but expressed in terms compatible with semiotics. Although our destination is cognitive 
semiotics, we will begin in an area in computer science where research and practice relevant to 
our target design problem is transpiring, but, in our view, lacks a means for describing what is 
lost.  
1.4.1 The Graphic-Linguistic Distinction 
We will begin by reviewing several leading accounts of the “graphic-linguistic distinction” from 
the field of diagrammatic reasoning. What will emerge is that charts and graphs designed for 
visual perceivers are mostly composed of items labelled via text, but located in relation to other 
labels through visually perceived spatial, geometric, and topological relationships. This section 
will discuss how spatial properties of sound could be recruited to convey spatial, geometric, or 
topological relations among labelled items that are currently lost in translation.  
1.4.2 From semiotics: iconic and symbolic properties of visually or aurally perceived items 
Synthesizing the various accounts of the graphic-linguistic distinction results in a pattern that 
suggests a more effective means to translate what is lost, but the terms for conveying spatial-
topological-geometric properties are unwieldy compared to corresponding terms in semiotics. 
Recruiting well established terms and concepts from semiotics will partially replace these 
unwieldy phrases. 
At this point, diagrams can then be described as iconically conveyed relations among 
symbolically conveyed items or objects. However, what principles could guide a designer in 
distinguishing between symbolic and iconic properties of a graphic? Also, how could a designer 
identify appropriate mappings from iconic properties of visual graphics to those of sound to 
convey the same relations? 
1.4.3 Perceptual-Cognitive Properties of Pictures, Diagrams, and Text (Coppin, 2014) 
To answer these two questions, we will introduce Coppin’s (2014) perceptual-cognitive model, 
which distinguishes between what he calls the pictorial and symbolic properties of graphics, and 
where he conceptualizes diagrams as pictorial relations among symbolic objects. Pictorial and 
symbolic properties in this model will be shown to be respectively akin to iconic and symbolic 
properties from semiotics. 
1.4.4 Application 
With this synthesis in place, the final section applies the synthesized model to the target design 
problem to precisely identify what is lost in translation and offers a solution to inform translation. 
2. The Graphic-Linguistic Distinction: Implications for Sonic Interface Design 
We will now examine the “graphic-linguistic distinction.” Out of seven candidate distinctions 
that Shimojima (1999) identifies we will discuss four, in relation to how they extend the idea of 
this distinction into sound. Because Shimojima’s discussion assumes that “generally, pictures, 
images, and diagrams are graphical representations” (p. 313), any characterization of graphical 
representations here applies also to diagrams. 
2.1. 2D Versus Sequential 
The first distinction to review comes from Larkin and Simon (1987), who define a diagrammatic 
representation as a “data structure in which information is indexed by two-dimensional location” 
and a sentential representation as “a data structure in which elements appear in a single sequence” 
(p. 68). By definition, a text description (Figure 1d) in its visual form is therefore sentential, 
because text is arranged as a linear sequence of marks, whereas the original chart (Figure 1a) is 
diagrammatic because financial values are indicated via marks indexed to a 2D grid. Larkin and 
Simon also state that diagrammatic representations “preserve explicitly the information about the 
topographical and geometric relations among the components of the problem” (Figure 2, upper 
right) whereas sentential representations do not (p. 66). Thus, the spatial relations among the 
labelled marks enable one to visually perceive the contour of the line or the relative positions of 
marks scattered across the 2D surface, thereby inferring values and trends that are not explicitly 
conveyed via labels (cf. Barwise and Etchemendy, 1995).  
 
 
Figure 2. Diagrammatic versus sentential representations via sonic and visual perceptual modes.  
 
2.1.1 Implications for sonic charts and graphs 
Because Larkin and Simon’s definitions do not require the information in the data structures to be 
visual, text descriptions in their text-to-speech form are already by definition sentential. Now 
note that forming a 2D space in the sonic domain will require two properties of sound that can be 
independently manipulated and perceived. Identifying such sonic properties should enable 
designers to construct sonic external representations that are diagrammatic (as defined by Larkin 
and Simon), which when used to translate visually perceived diagrammatic structures should 
enable conveying topographical and geometric relations that cannot be conveyed via text-to-
speech translations. We can imagine, for example, how in Figure 2 (lower right) a blind or low-
vision user could press arrow keys to move an “audio cursor” along the x-axis of an imagined 2D 
space to perceive the contours of the graph. 
2.2. Relation Symbols and Object Symbols 
The second distinction to examine comes from Russell (1923), who proposes that in sentences 
“words which mean relations are not themselves relations,” whereas in maps, for instance, “a 
relation is represented by a relation” (p. 90). For example, a financial chart (Figure 1a) conveys 
higher and lower monetary values via marks at higher and lower elevations, respectively. This 
convention enables the visually perceived spatial relationships between the marks to represent 
relationships among monetary values over time.  
2.2.1 Implications for sonic charts and graphs 
To consider how relations can be conveyed sonically, consider two tones A and B in the 
foregoing example, where A has a lower pitch than B (Figure 3). Their sonic relation is then their 
perceptible difference in pitch. Now if Tone A denotes a stock price at an earlier point in time, 
and Tone B a stock price at a later point in time, then the perceptible difference between their 
pitches can convey the difference in price over time. Moving the sonic cursor from left to right 
would then result in a higher pitch, conveying the relationship between the stock price over time 












“A is lower than B and 
B is to the right of A”
 
Figure 3. By scrubbing a “sonic cursor” along an axis, audiences could access sonically 
conveyed relations through changes in pitch and via stereo. 
 
2.3. Analogue Versus Digital 
We next explore the analogue-versus-digital distinction, most commonly associated with 
Goodman (1968). Analogue systems are dense throughout, where a system being dense refers to 
the ability to place a new element between any two elements in a representation ad infinitum, and 
any new element added can change the meaning of the representation. Digital systems, in 
contrast, are discontinuous and differentiated throughout. Goodman claims that pictorial 
representations are also defined by their degree of repleteness, which refers to the number of 
possible perceptual features that can vary before changing the representation’s meaning. Thus 
pictures are analogue and more replete, diagrams are also analogue but less replete, but linguistic 
systems are partially digital. 
In other words, an analogue representation can have an infinite number of variations within 
a representational space that can carry unique meanings. If a representation is digital, however, 
the number of meanings are limited.  
2.3.1 Implications for sonic charts and graphs 
Using the analogue instead of the digital properties of visually perceived graphics appears to 
require two interrelated capabilities: lower-level capabilities to perceptually process features from 
an environment or representation, and higher-level capabilities to recognize the linguistic 
categories of the perceptually processed features (Mandler, 2006). For example, discerning the 
values on a financial chart requires perceptually processing the light reflected from the chart to 
observe lines in relation to textual labels. Discerning the same values aurally would require the 
same set of interrelated capabilities: lower-level capabilities to process varying frequencies, 
timbre, and so on, as well as higher-level capabilities to recognize the linguistic meanings of the 
sounds. The current text-to-speech approach exploits only the digital properties of language; 
designers could produce more effective translations sonically by exploiting the analogue 
properties of sound. 
2.4. Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Constraints 
Last to examine is the “intrinsic versus extrinsic constraints” distinction (Shimojima, 1999, 
p. 328) where “representations obeying inherent constraints” are considered graphical (p. 332). 
Let us, however, examine what he quoted from Barwise and Etchemendy (1990):  
Diagrams are physical situations. They must be, since we can see them. As such, they 
obey their own set of constraints . . . By choosing a representational scheme 
appropriately, so that the constraints on the diagrams have a good match with the 
constraints on the described situation, the diagram can generate a lot of information that 
the user never need infer. Rather, the user can simply read off facts from the diagram as 
needed. This situation is in stark contrast to sentential inference, where even the most 
trivial consequence needs to be inferred explicitly. (p. 22) 
To illustrate that “diagrams are physical situations,” consider how a picture or diagram 
conveys topological and geometric information through visual perception enables the illustration 
in Figure 4a to describe many relationships. However, each description conveys a different story 
about what is shown visually and therefore affords different inferences. Barwise and Etchemendy 
(1990, p. 22) thus note that a diagram can show “countless facts” (by which they mean one can 
construct multiple sentences from a diagram). 
2.4.1 Implications for sonic charts and graphs 
When Barwise and Etchemendy (1990, p. 22) refer to diagrams as “physical situations,” they are 
referring to properties (and affordances) of diagrams that can interact with a human perception 
system. Designers seeking to extend the affordances of visual diagrams to the sonic domain are 
challenged to identify properties or dimensions of sound that similarly make use of “physical 
situations” (that interact with human perception ) to enable multiple stories to be described about 
the relationships that are shown sonically.  
Extending the example in Figure 3, the hybrid stereo–varying frequency interface should 
enable one to “hear the shape” of a contour. If text-to-speech labels are indexed to the contour, 
then the user should be able to form multiple sentences about the geometric and/or topological 
relations among the labelled elements.  
2.5. Summarizing Extensions of the Graphic-Linguistic Distinction Into the Sonic 
Domain 
Extending these classic graphic-linguistic distinctions thus suggests the following design 
opportunities when designing sonic versions of visual charts and graphs: 
• The 2D versus sequential distinction suggests the need to identify perceptually 
distinguishable spatial properties of sound in order to afford the communication of spatial, 
geometric, or topological information.  
• The analogue versus digital distinction suggests that analogue properties of sound, such as 
frequency, timbre, stereo, and echo could convey analogue properties of visual graphs.  
• The relation symbols versus object symbols distinction suggests that analogue and spatial 
properties of sound noted previously could be recruited to map numerical values to 
perceptual dimensions.  
• The intrinsic versus extrinsic constraints distinction suggests the need to identify 
“physical situations” that naturally emerge via the human perceptual processing of sound 
so that “countless facts” (building upon Barwise and Etchemendy, 1990, p. 22) can be 
inferred from those sonically conveyed physical situations.  
2.6. Recasting the Graphic-Linguistic Distinction in Semiotics Terms 
Although Shimojima is dissecting the characteristics of graphical and linguistic properties from 
the perspective of diagrammatic reasoning, semiotics has long been tackling this very problem. 
Semiotics can therefore provide us with a developed terminology and further insights regarding 
the differences between picture and language.  
One tradition that can inform us comes from Lessing, who in Laokoon points out that while 
the link between the signs of language and their objects is arbitrary, pictures employ qualities of 
expression that carry similarities to their object. Scholars including Bayer, Wellbery, and 
Sonesson further developed Lessing’s distinction and helped define the properties and 
communicative limits of language versus picture.  
Another relevant tradition is Peirce’s, especially his idea of the icon. Although iconicity is 
usually defined in terms of similarity to its object, Stjernfelt (2000) points out that Peirce has 
actually provided what Stjernfelt calls an operational definition or criterion for iconicity: “by the 
direct observation of it other truths concerning its object can be discovered than those which 
suffice to determine its construction” (Syllabus 2.279 as cited by Stjernfelt, 2000). 
Our target design problem then can be characterized as creating, in the sonic domain, 
accessible graphics that is iconic in character. A key point here about Peirce’s operational 
criterion is that it does not privilege vision; iconicity is thus in principle relevant also to audition, 
tactition, and so on.  
Peirce’s icon is one among the semiotic triangle of icon, index, and symbol. An index 
points to its object through an indirect relationship (e.g., smoke to mean fire), whereas a symbol’s 
relation to its object is arbitrary (e.g., words and their meanings). In relating to Shimojima’s 
graphic-linguistic distinction, graphics then correspond most naturally with icons, while linguistic 
representations correspond to symbols. In particular: 
•  “Spatial, geometric, or topological information” of a visual or sonic information 
display is akin to iconic properties of a visual or sonic display, and  
• “Intrinsic constraints” (physical situations, as stated in Barwise and Etchemendy, 
1990, p. 22) of a visual or sonic information display are akin to iconic properties of 
a visual or sonic display.  
Peirce also developed a notion of diagram that was later interpreted by Stjernfeldt’s (2000). 
This notion of diagram will be compared and contrasted with this essay’s emerging notion in 
Section 3.4 (Part 5).  
3. Provisional Model 
I now introduce a basic model of perception and action, with the goal of integrating these ideas 
into a coherent system to inform design and aid understanding. 
3.1. Part 1: Perception-Reaction to Environmental Change and Variation 
Suppose an individual reaches for and grasps an object, such as a cup on a table (Figure 4a). 
Reflected light from the cup (Figure 4d) and its surrounding environment is picked up by retinal 
detectors and perceptually processed to inform a reaching and grasping action with fingers and 
hand positioned to grasp both the proximal and distal sides of the cup (Figures 5b–c).  
This perception-reaction loop (cf. Gibson, 1986) comprises two relevant interrelated 
aspects: First, because the proximal side is visible, reflected light from the proximal side of the 
cup is picked up (cf. Gibson, 1986) and processed by sensory receptors. But because the distal 
side is invisible, the other aspect is the capability to anticipate, predict, or simulate (cf. Barsalou, 
2009) the curvature of the distal side of the cup to inform a hand–finger orientation that is 
sufficient to grip the unseen distal surface (Hockema, 2004; Anstis, Verstraten and Mather, 1998; 
Goldstone, 1998; Freyd, 1992). 
 
 Figure 4. Information pickup versus simulation. 
 
Because individuals predict or simulate an author’s intended meaning when they recognize 
features of an external representation, prediction or simulation capabilities can enable individuals 
to use external graphic representations (Coppin, 2014). For example, based on prior experience in 
Western culture, an individual looking at a religious painting in a European church might predict 
that a flying white dove is intended to have a religious significance. Similarly, an individual 
reading the written word “cat” might predict that the author intended to convey the conceptual 
category of CAT (see Coppin, 2014, Chapter 3). This has been termed the “conventionalized” 
account of representation (Kulvicki, 2010).  
Although this conventionalized account is uncontroversial for describing how individuals 
infer meanings intended by authors of written graphics such as text, applying the 
conventionalized account to picture perception is controversial (Gibson, 1960, 1971, 1978; 
Gombrich, Arnheim, and Gibson, 1971; Goodman, 1968; Kennedy, 1974; Kulvicki, 2010; 
Coppin, 2011, 2014). Many researchers have, instead, claimed that picture perception recruits 
unlearned, innate, or inherited biologically grounded capabilities to perceive and react in 
environments composed of occluded surfaces and edges (Gibson, 1960, 1971, 1978; Kennedy, 
1974). Rather than describing picture perception capabilities in terms of innateness, Coppin 
(2014) describes how pictures make use of capabilities that inherently develop when learning to 
perceive and react within a physical environment composed of surfaces and edges. 
3.2. Part 2: The Anatomy of Perception-Reaction 
Recall that grasping the cup requires capabilities to pick up reflected light and to simulate the 
distal side. Memory traces of past perception-reactions (conjunctive neurons) are the resources 
from which simulations are constructed.  
Simulation involves many of the same neural systems used during perception (Kosslyn, 
Ganis, and Thompson, 2001). If I simulate (imagine) a jet flying from left to right, I use many of 
the same processes and systems for perceiving an actual jet (Kosslyn, Ganis, and Thompson, 
2001). In the cup example, when I perceive the cup, I also inform potential action (reaching for 
and grasping the proximal and distal sides of the cup). Thus, perception and simulation are 
integrated aspects of perception-reaction within a physical environment. 
3.2.1 Pictorial properties of graphics (and comparison to the semiotic notion of iconic) 
Let us now apply this simple model to external graphic representation. Suppose a viewer looks at 
the European painting described previously. Ambient light is reflected from the painted surface to 
produce optic arrays that are picked up by retinal detectors. The optic arrays are processed by 
lower-level perceptual categories and lower-level simulators to enable perception of a dove – a 
depicted object other than the painted surface. Even if the viewer has never seen a bird (or does 
not have a conceptual category for one), she can still perceptually process the spherical shape of 
the head, the cone-like shape of the beak, the hemispherical shape of the eyes, and so on, because 
she has spent a lifetime developing the capabilities to pick up and perceptually process the kinds 
of optic arrays that the artist has artificially produced via markings. These are the pictorial 
properties of a graphic. 
Pictorial properties make use of lower-level perceptual categorization capabilities and 
simulators developed to perceive and react within environments composed of occluded surfaces 
and edges (geometric and topological relationships of an environment). Thus, pictorial properties 
inherently convey geometric and topological relationships associated with Larkin and Simon’s 
(1989) diagrammatic definition. Pictorial properties are also defined as that which is picked up at 
the sensory surface when light reflects from a graphic. Thus, pictorial properties can be processed 
and interpreted for identification under multiple conceptual categories. In other words, pictorial 
properties are clearly on the analogue side of the analogue–digital spectrum. Finally, pictorial 
properties of graphics are clearly physical situations: The marks configured by the artist are 
precisely what produces the perceptual structure that the viewer picks up.  
Iconicity is often described in terms of similarity to the represented object. However, as 
previously discussed, iconic representations also have an internal logic or set of rules. This is akin 
to Coppin’s (2014) perceptual-cognitive approach to the pictorial-symbolic distinction because, 
in that account, graphic representations are composed of both pictorial and symbolic properties 
but to varying degrees. Returning to the dove example: During perceptual processing of the optic 
arrays from the painted surface, lower-level simulators enable perceptual processing of the 
depiction as a 3D shape. These are the same capabilities that enable perceptual processing of the 
proximal side in the cup example to engender simulations of the distal side of the cup. In other 
words, pictorial properties include an “internal logic” or “set of rules” (the simulations of the 
distal side of the cup or bird).  
This integrates Coppin’s perceptual-cognitive conceptualization of pictorial properties with 
the notion of iconicity from semiotics. To prevent confusion, this integrated notion of iconicity 
will be referred to as iconic′
2
. 
3.2.2 Symbolic properties of graphics (and comparison to the semiotic notion of symbolic) 
In Coppin’s model, symbolic properties make use of capabilities and simulators developed to 
categorize concrete structures configured by an author (for example, by marking a surface) and 
perceptually processed from an environment. Thus, symbolic properties inherently convey 
higher-level conceptual categories most often associated with and best communicated via 
language. If language is temporal (cf. Sonesson, 1988, p. 91) and temporality implies 
sequentiality, symbolic properties then more closely correspond to Larkin and Simon’s (1989) 
sentential definition. Symbolic properties are also defined as the simulations intended by an 
author that fall under the author’s intended conceptual categories, thus placing symbolic 
properties on the digital side of the analogue–digital spectrum. Finally, symbolic properties of 
graphics are the inverse of physical situations: They are less easily mapped back to what could be 




 In mathematics, the ′ (prime) symbol is often suffixed to an existing symbol to denote a related concept. We are borrowing the 
symbol here to suggest that although the integrated concept is closely related to iconicity, the two might not be identical. 
 Note that in Coppin’s model, a perceptual system can still pick up the pictorial properties 
of writing from an unfamiliar language, but that individual may be unable produce simulations 
necessary for the symbolic properties (simulations of the author’s probable intended meaning; see 
Coppin, 2014, Chapter 3). Because symbolic properties make use of higher-level simulators at 
the convergence of sensory modes and are more amodal, these simulations fall under conceptual 
categories that do not correspond to what could be perceptually processed from the physical 
world. Symbolic properties will therefore be arbitrarily related to their objects, coinciding with 
how symbols in semiotics are also understood in terms of their arbitrary (conventionalized) 
relationship to their objects. 
Coppin’s perceptual-cognitive conceptualization of symbolic properties is therefore quite 
consistent with the notion of symbolicity from semiotics. However, to prevent confusion, this 
integrated notion of symbolicity will be referred to as symbolic′. 
3.3. Part 4: Model Extended to Sound (and Cross Modal Representation) 
During perception-reaction, when memory traces of an Item A become encoded (the cup in the 
previous example), Item A is encoded within a context with other items (Barsalou, 2009), such as 
the table (Item B) that the cup was sitting on, my memories of how the cup felt when I grasped it 
(Item C), how it tasted (Item D), and how it sounded (Item E). Thus, as lower-level perceptual 
simulators and perceptual categories for vision develop over a lifetime, they develop in networks 
with other lower-level simulators and perceptual categories for hearing, touching, and seeing. 
This results in what is known as cross modal correspondence. For example,  in our physical 
environment, smaller objects vibrate at higher frequencies and larger objects at lower 
frequencies, so individuals developing in such an environment might thus “naturally” associate 
smaller objects with higher-frequency sounds and larger objects with lower-frequency sounds 
(Spence, 2011). Such natural associations could explain conventions that have emerged for 
representing sound that go far into human history, such as music notation systems (Figure 5), 
where higher-pitched sounds are represented by marks at higher elevations, and recent 
psychophysical research supports this claim (Parise, Knorre, and Ernst, 2014). 
 
 Figure 5. Music notations use a convention where marks at higher elevations represent higher-
frequency sounds. Note. Bach, J. S. (n.d.). Suite in G minor, BWV 995 [Lute score]. Retrieved 
January 15, 2015 from http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bachlut1.png 
 
3.3.1 Sonic interface properties 
Let us now consider how iconic′ properties of sound can be conceptualized as the aural 
equivalents of the iconic′ properties of visual graphics (pictorial properties, according to Coppin, 
2014). Similar to how light reflected from a marked surface of a graphic picked up by retinal 
detectors was conceptualized as the iconic′ properties of visual graphics (pictorial properties; 
Part 3), this section conceptualizes iconic′ properties of sound as the sound vibrations propagated 
from an object picked up by sensory receptors of the ear and perceptually processed as objects in 
an environment. Similar to how iconic′ properties of visual graphics (pictorial properties) are 
transduced into nerve signals and processed by lower-level perceptual categorization and 
simulation capabilities that developed over a lifespan to enable perception of occluded surfaces 
and edges, sound vibrations are transduced into nerve signals and processed by lower-level 
perceptual categories and lower-level simulators that developed over a lifespan to enable 
perception-reaction within physical environments with topological and geometric properties. 
Thus, similar to how a visual designer can configure a marked surface of a graphic to produce 
iconic′ properties of visual graphics (pictorial properties) that make use of lower-level perceptual 
categories and simulators to enable perceptual processing of surfaces and edges that are other 
than a marked surface, a sound designer can configure an audio device to produce iconic′ 
properties of sound that make use of lower-level sound perceptual categories and simulators that 
enable perception-reaction within a physical world with topological and geometric properties, to 
enable an individual to perceptually process topological and geometric relationships (iconic′; 
perhaps via the Doppler effect, stereo, or echo) that are other than the device that is producing the 
sounds (“sonic pictures”).  
Let us next recruit the iconic′ and symbolic′ definitions to more carefully conceptualize 
sonic versions of visual charts and graphs. 
3.4. Part 5: Applying the Extended Model to the Graphic-Linguistic Distinction 
Applying these iconic′ and symbolic′ definitions to extend Larkin and Simon’s diagrammatic and 
sentential definitions requires replacing elements with symbols′ (as in Section 2.6) and 
sequentiality with symbolized′ relations.  
In a visual or sonic diagram, the relations among symbols′ are conveyed iconically′ (see 
Table 1) because they are picked up by sensory receptors via light/sounds reflected from a 
surface, and what is meaningful about what is perceived is the perceptually processed relations 
among the symbols′. In contrast, sentential relations are conveyed symbolically′ (see Table 1) 
because, although iconic′ properties of visual graphics are picked up by sensory receptors via 
light reflected from a surface, what is meaningful about what is perceptually processed are the 
author’s intended simulation, and the conceptual category that the intended simulation is intended 
to fall under. 
 
Table 1. Diagrams are composed of iconically′ represented relations among 
symbolically′ represented objects and sentences convey symbolically′ 
represented relations among symbolically′ represented objects.  
 Diagram Sentence 
Relations Iconically′ represented Symbolically′ represented 
Objects Symbolically′ represented Symbolically′ represented 
 
Let us now compare this essay’s notion of diagram developed thus far with Peirce’s 
definition. In Peirce’s system, diagrams are a type of icon, and are defined by their “skeleton-like 
sketch of relations between parts” (p. 363). The notion of diagram developed in this essay thus 
far, where relations among objects are conveyed via an iconic′ perceptual feature (e.g., 
visuospatial location, pitch, tactile size, etc.), while objects are denoted symbolically′, is 
potentially synergistic with the Peirce-Stjernfeldt account because iconically′ conveyed relations 
could be seen as akin to aforementioned skeleton-like sketch of relations among parts. The word 
diagrammatic, could thus be a term that refers to iconically′ conveyed relations among parts.  
3.5. Applying The Model to an Example Design Problem 
Let us now return to the WCAG text description example from Figure 1 in order to demonstrate 
how this model aids understanding and can inform design. The problem with the text description 
(Figure 1d) is that all content is conveyed symbolically′ (via text-to-speech) whereas the original 
visual graphic conveys much of the content via iconic′ (pictorial) properties of visual graphics. If 
a designer aims to present the chart sonically, how can the designer decide which aspects should 
be conveyed via symbolic′ properties (text-to-speech) and which aspects should be conveyed via 
iconic′ properties of sound (spatial sound)? Recall the pictorial and iconic′ definitions, where 
pictorial and iconic′ properties are predicted to afford the communication of concrete structures 
more effectively than symbolic′-linguistic properties, and an aspect of a graphic can be identified 
as more concrete if it produces a perceptual structure that corresponds to what could be picked up 
and perceptually processed from a physical environment (Part 3). The shape contour (Figure 1b) 
is thus primarily pictorial-iconic, and is therefore more appropriate for translation using iconic′ 
properties of spatial sound. 
To determine the aspects of the graphic that should be conveyed via text-to-speech, recall 
the symbolic′ definition, where symbolic′ properties are predicted to afford the communication of 
abstract conceptual categories more effectively than pictorial or iconic′ properties, and a concept 
can be identified as more abstract if it is more amodal (Part 3), in that it is less easily mapped 
back to a structure that could be picked up and perceptually processed from a physical 
environment. The numbers that label increments on the x- and y-axis are thus more symbolic′ 
because they cannot be mapped back to a perceptual structure that could be picked up from a 
physical environment. 
Figure 7 shows a spark line visualization of financial cost over time
3
 (top left) and the 
corresponding spectral display of its sonic translation (top right). A spark line could be 
considered an abstraction (e.g., the value of a commodity) mapped to a concrete structure (e.g., a 
mountain’s varying elevation from left to right). A text description of the mountain’s shape 
would convey a string of conceptual categories that could refer to many possible concrete 
mountain shapes. However, sound frequencies that rise and fall with the elevation (spatial 
structure) of the drawn mountain (e.g., if panning from left to right) could translate the pictorially 
(iconically′) conveyed spatial structure of the mountain more accurately. Two additions to the 
varying sound frequency could aid shape comprehension: A baseline tone at middle C (akin to a 
horizon line) and “shading” under contours via bandpass-filtered white noise cut off at the 
varying frequency and at the horizon line. 
 
Figure 4. Spectral translations (right) of visuals (left).  
                                                        
3 For a movie that demonstrates this prototype, please go to http://perceptualartifacts.org/agi/research/sonification/ 
 4. Conclusion 
I have proposed a provisional model to underpin the various accounts of the graphic-linguistic 
and iconic-symbolic distinctions described in the literature. The model allows us to extend the 
graphic-linguistic and iconic-symbolic distinctions into aural and cross-modal domains.  
The model distinguishes between two interrelated capabilities: Lower-level perceptual 
capabilities to pick up and perceptually process concrete structures of an environment, and 
higher-level capabilities to process and interpret how perceptually processed structures fall under 
more abstract conceptual categories.  
The model conceptualizes iconic′ properties of both visual graphics and sound as what is 
picked up by sensory receptors and processed by lower-level perceptual categories and simulators 
that develop over a lifespan to enable individuals to perceptually process occluded surfaces and 
edges (topographical and geometric relationships) of a physical environment, thus enabling the 
perceptual processing of geometrical and topographical relationships that are other than the 
surface of the external representation.  
The model thus predicts iconic′ properties to afford the communication of concrete 
structures more effectively than symbolic′ or linguistic properties. Also, symbolic′ properties are 
thought to emerge when an individual perceptually processes iconic′ properties of an external 
representation that an author intentionally configures to cause the perceiver to have a simulation 
that falls under the author’s intended conceptual category. The model thus predicts symbolic′ 
properties to afford the communication of abstract conceptual categories more effectively than 
iconic′ properties. 
By reverse engineering the classic graphic-linguistic distinction to more fundamental 
perceptual principles, I have introduced a means to understand how the distinction applies to 
sonic representations.  
The proposed model streamlines definitions that distinguish diagrammatic from sentential 
structures: Text-sentences comprise symbolically′ represented relations among symbolically′ 
represented objects, whereas diagrams are iconically′ represented relations among symbolically′ 
represented objects. A sonic diagram is thus conceptualized as iconically′ conveyed sonic 
relations among objects linguistically (symbolicly′) conveyed via text-to-speech.  
  
This proposed model enables researchers and designers to generate testable predictions for 
converting visual graphics into non-visual perceptual modes (other than the text-to-speech 
approach proposed by WCAG, which ignores the pictorial properties of graphics).  
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